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                                    IS ONTOLOGY MAKING US STUPID? 
This is a translation and expansion of my paper given at Bernard Stiegler’s Summer 
Academy in August 2012. In it I consider the ontologies of Louis Althusser, Graham 
Harman, and Paul Feyerabend.
Abstract: I begin by “deconstructing” the title and explaining that Feyerabend does 
not really use the word “ontology”, though he does call his position sometimes (and 
the “sometimes” is important) ontological realism. I explain that he talks about his 
position as indifferently a “general methodology” or a “general cosmology”, and that 
he seems to be be hostile to the very enterprise of ontology, conceived of as “school 
philosophy”. I then go on to say that there is perhaps a concept of a different type of 
ontology, that I call a “diachronic ontology” that perhaps he would have accepted, 
and that is very different from ontology as ordinarily thought, which I claim to be 
synchronic ontology (having no room for the dialogue with Being, but just supposing 
that Being is already and always there without our contribution). I discuss Althusser 
and Graham Harman as exemplifying synchronic ontology, giving a reading of 
Harman’s recent book THE THIRD TABLE. I then discuss Feyerabend’s ideas as 
showing a different way, that of a diachronic ontology, in which there is no stable 
framework or fixed path. I end with Andrew Pickering whose essay NEW 
ONTOLOGIES makes a similar distinction to mine, expressing it in the imagistic 
terms of a De Kooningian (diachronic) versus a Mondrianesque (synchronic) 
approach.
                                                  
IS ONTOLOGY MAKING US STUPID?
A. INTRODUCTION
The question posed in the title, is ontology making us stupid?, is in reference to 
Nicholas Carr’s book THE SHALLOWS, which is an elaboration of his earlier essy 
IS GOOGLE MAKING US STUPID?, and I will destroy the suspense by giving you 
the answer right away: Yes and No. Yes ontology can make us more stupid if it 
privileges the synchronic, and I will give two examples: (1) the «marxist» ontology 
of Louis Althusser and (2) the object-oriented ontology of Graham Harman. No, on 
the contrary, it can make us less stupid, if it privileges the diachronic, and here I will 
give the example of the pluralist ontology of Paul Feyerabend.
Normally, I should give a little definition of ontology: the study of being as being, or 
the study of the most fundamental categories of beings, or the general theory of 
objects and their relations. However, this paper ends with a presentation of the ideas 
of Paul Feyerabend, and it must be noted that Feyerabend himself does not use the 
word «ontology», preferring instead to talk, indifferently, of «general cosmology» or 
of «general methodology». Sometimes as well he talks of the underlying system of 
categories of a worldview. And towards the end of his life he began to talk of Being 
with a capital B, but he always emphasized that we should not get hung up on one 
particular word or approach because there is no «stable framework which 
encompasses everything», and that any name or argument or approach only 
«accompanies us on our journey without tying it to a fixed road» (Feyerabend’s 
Letter to the Reader, Against Method xvi, available here: http://www.kjf.ca/31-
C2BOR.htm. Feyerabend explicitly indicated that his own «deconstructive» approach 
derived from his fidelity to this ambiguity and this fluidity. Thus ontology for 
Feyerabend implies a journey, ie a process of individuation, without a fixed road and 
without a stable framework.
As for «stupid», it refers to a process of «stupidification» or dumbing down, of dis-
individuation, that tends to impose on us just such a fixed road and stable framework. 
The word «making» also calls for explanation. We are noetic creatures, and so the 
good news is that we can never be completely stupid, or completely disindividuated, 
except in case of brain death. The bad news is that we can always become stupider 
than we are today, just as we can always become more open, more fluid, more 
multiple, more differenciated, in short more individuated. Ontology is not a magic 
wand that can transform us into an animal or a god, but it can favorise one or the 
other fork of the bifurcation of paths.
ARGUMENT: My argument will be very simple:
1. traditional ontologies are based on an approach to the real that privileges the 
synchronic dimension, where the paths are fixed and the framework is stable. 
Althusser and Harman are good examples of synchronic ontology. 
2. Another types of ontology is possible, and it exists sporadically, which 
privileges the diachronic dimension, and thus the aspects of plurality and 
becoming, the paths are multiple and the framework is fluid. Feyerabend is a 
good example of diachronic ontology. 
NB: For the sake of brevity, I talk of synchronic and of diachronic ontologies, but in 
fact each type of ontology contains elements of the other type, and it is simply a 
matter of the primacy given to the synchronic over the diachronic, or the inverse.
Philosophy is inseparable from a series of radical conversions where our 
comprehension of all that exists is transformed. In itself, such a capacity for 
conversion or paradigm change is rather positive. A problem arises when this 
conversion amounts to a reduction of our vision and to an impoverishment of our life, 
if it makes us stupid. My conversion to a diachronic ontology took place in 1972, 
when I read Feyerabend’s AGAINST METHOD (NB: this was the earlier essay 
version, with several interesting developments that were left out of the book)., where 
he gives an outline of a pluralist ontology and an epistemology. On reading it I was 
transported, transformed, converted; unfortunately, at the same period my philosophy 
department converted to a very different philosophy – Althusserianism
B. ALTHUSSER AND ALTHUSSERIANISM
In fact, 1973 was a year that marked a turning point between the “diachronic 
tempest” of the 60s and the synchronic return to order desired by the Althusserians. I 
am deliberately using the expression that Bernard Stiegler uses to describe the 
invention of metaphysics as it was put to work in Plato’s REPUBLIC, in support of a 
project of synchronisation of minds and behaviours. I was the unwilling and 
unconsenting witness of an attempt at such a synchronisation on a small scale: my 
department, the Department of General Philosophy, sank into the dogmatic project, 
explicitly announced as such, of forming radical (ie Althusserian) intellectuals under 
the aegis of Althusserian Marxist Science. A small number of Althusserian militants 
took administrative and intellectual control of the department, and by all sorts of 
techniques of propaganda, intimidation, harassment and exclusion, forced all its 
members, or almost all, either to conform to the Althusserian party line or to leave.
Intellectually the Althusserians imposed an onto-epistemological meta-language in 
terms of which they affirmed the radical difference between science and ideology, 
and the scientificity of Marxism. It is customary to describe Althusserianism from the 
epistemological point of view, but it also had an ontological dimension, thanks to its 
distinction between real objects and theoretical objects: scientific practice produces, 
according to them, its own objects, theoretical objects, as a means of knowing the real 
objects. The objects of everyday life, the objects of common sense, and even 
perceptual objects, are not real objects, but ideological constructions, simulacra (as 
Harman will later claim, they are “utter shams”).
Faced with this negative conversion of an entire department, I tried to resist. Because 
I am “counter-suggestible” (as Feyerabend claimed to be) – in other words, because i 
am faithful to the process of individuation rather than to a party line – I devoted 
myself to a critique of Althusserianism. Its rudimentary ontology, the determination 
of Being in terms of real objects, corresponds to a transcendental point of view of 
first philosophy which acts as a hindrance to scientific practice, and pre-constrains 
the type of theoretical construction that it can elaborate. To maintain the diachronicity 
of the sciences one cannot retain the strict demarcation between real objects and 
theoretical objects, nor between science and ideology. The sciences thus risk being 
demoted to the same plane as any other ideological construction and having their 
objects demoted to the status of simulacra. This is a step that the Althusserians did 
not take, but that, as we shall see, Harman does, thus relieving the sciences of their 
privileged status.
NB: The set of interviews with Jacques Derrida, POLITICS AND FRIENDSHIP, 
describes the same phenomenon of intellectual pretention and intimidation supported 
by a theory having an aura of epistemologica and ontologicall sophistication but 
which was radically deficient. Derrida emphasises that the concepts of “object” and 
of “objectivity” were deployed without sufficient analysis of their pertinence nor of 
their theoretical and practical utility and groundedness.
After the period of Althusserian hegemony came a new period of “diachronic storm”, 
this time on the intellectual plane. Translations came out of works by Foucault and 
Derrida, but also of Lyotard and Deleuze. Althusserian dogmas were contested and 
deconstructed. But for me there still remained serious limitations on thought despite 
this new sophistication. There was an ontological dimension common to all these 
authors, and this ontological dimension was either neglected or ignored by the 
defenders of French Theory. Feyerabend himself seemed to be in need of an ontology 
to re-inforce his pluralism and to protect it against dogmatic incursions of the 
Althusserian type and against relativist dissolutions of the post-modern type. I 
obtained a scholarship to go and study in Paris, and I left Australia in 1980 to 
continue my ontological and epistemological research.
What I retain from this experience, over and above the need to maintain and to push 
forward the deconstruction by elaborating a new sort of ontology to accompany its 
advances, is the feeling of disappointment with the contradictory sophistication in 
Althusserian philosophy. I had the impression that it pluralised and diachronised with 
one hand what it reduced and synchronised with the other. Thus, despite its initial 
show of sophistication it made its acolytes stupid, disindividuated. Further, as an 
instrument of synchronisation on the large scale it was doomed to failure by its 
Marxism and its scientism, both of which made securing its general adoption an 
impossible mission. It would have been necessary to de-marxise and de-scientise its 
theory to make it acceptable to the greatest number. Further, its diffusion was limited 
to the academic microcosm, because at that time there was no internet. These 
limitations to the theory’s propagation (Marxism, scientism, academic confinement) 
have been deconstructed and overcome by a new philosophical movement, called 
OOO (object-oriented ontology) which has conquered a new sort of philosophical 
public. Lastly, I retain a distrust of any “movement” in philosophy, and of the power 
tactics (propaganda, intimidation, harassment, exclusion) that are inevitably implied. 
Oblivious to this sort of “wariness” with respect to the sociology of homo 
academicus, the OOOxians publicise themselves as a movement and attribute the 
rapid diffusion of their ideas to their mastery of digital social technologies.
C: HARMAN AND OBJECT-ORIENTED ONTOLOGY
In THE THIRD TABLE, Harman gives a brief summary of the principle themes of 
his object-oriented ontology. It is a little book, published this year in a bilingual 
(English-German) edition, and theEnglish text occupies a little over 11 pages (p4-15). 
The content is quite engaging as Harman accomplishes the exploit of presenting his 
principal ideas in the form of a response to Eddington’s famous “two tables” 
argument. This permits him toformulate his arguments in terms of a continuous 
polemic against reductionism in both its humanistic and scientistic forms. All that is 
fine, so far as it goes. However, problems arise when we examine his presentation of 
each of Eddington’s two tables, and even more so with his presentation of his own 
contribution to the discussion: a “third table”, the only real one in Harman’s eyes.
In the introduction to his book THE NATURE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD (1928), 
Eddington begins with an apparent paradox: “I have just settled down to the task of 
writing these lectures and have drawn up my chairs to my two tables. Two tables! 
Yes; there are duplicates of every object about me two tables, two chairs, two pens” 
(xi). Eddington explains that there is the familiar object, the table as a substantial 
thing, solid and reliable,against which I can support myself. But, according to him, 
modern physics speaks of a quite different table: “My scientific table is mostly 
emptiness. Sparsely scattered in that emptiness are numerous electric charges rushing 
about with great speed” (xii). Eddington contrasts the substantiality of the familiar 
table (a solid thing, easy to visualise as such) and the abstraction of the scientific 
table (mostly empty space, a set of physical measures related by mathematical 
formulae). The familiar world of common sense is a world of illusions, whereas the 
the scientific worl, the only real world according to modern physics, is a world of 
shadows.
What is the relation between the two worlds? Eddington poses the question and 
dramatises the divergence between the two worlds, but contrary to what Harman 
seems to think, he gives no answer of his own. He declares that premature attempts to 
determine their relation are harmful, more of a hindrance than a help, to research. In 
fact, Eddington refuses to commit himself on the ontological question posed in his 
introduction because he is convinced that it is empirical research, mobilising 
psychology and physiology as well as physics, which must give the answer. It is clear 
that he would have regarded Althusserianism as just such a premature and harmful 
attempt. But what would he have thought of OOO? We shall return to this question in 
the last part of this talk.
In his little text Harman explains very succinctly the difference between the two 
tables. But in opposition to Eddington’s supposed scientism, Harman affirms that 
these two tables are “equally unreal” (p6), that they are just fakes or simulacra (“utter 
shams”, 6). Assigning each table to one side of the gap that separates the famous “two 
cultures” dear to C.P.Snow (the culture of the humanities on one side, that of the 
sciences on the other), he finds that both are products of reductionism, which negates 
the reality of the table.
“The scientist reduces the table downward to tiny particles invisible to the eye; the 
humanist reduces it upward to a series of effects on people and other things” (6).
Refusing reductionism and its simulacra, Harman poses the existence of a third table 
(the “only real” table, 10) which serves as an emblem for a third culture to come 
whose paradigm could be taken from the arts which attempt to “establish objects 
deeper than the features through which they are announced, or allude to objects that 
cannot quite be made present” (THE THIRD TABLE, 14). Philosophy itself is to 
abandon its scientific pretentions in order to speak at last of the real world and its 
objects.
In WORD AND OBJECT Quine proposes a technique called “semantic ascent” to 
resolve certain problems in philosophy. He invites us to formulate our philosophical 
problems no longer in material terms, as questions concerning the components of the 
world (“objects”) but rather in formal terms, as questions concerning the correct use 
and the correct analysis of our linguistic expressions (“words”). The idea was to find 
common ground to discuss impartially the pretentions of rival points of view. 
Unfortunately, this method turned out to be useless to resolve most problems, as the 
important disputes concern just as much the terms to employ and their interpretation 
as soon as we take up an interesting philosophical problem.
Inversely, Graham Harman with his new ontology proposes a veritable semantic 
descent (or we could call it an “objectal descent”), to reverse the linguistic turn, and 
to replace it with an ontological turn. According to him the fundamental problems of 
ontology must be reformulated in terms of objects and their qualities. These objects 
are not the objects of our familiar world, let us recall that Harman declares that the 
familiar table is unreal, a simulacrum, an “utter sham”. The real object is a 
philosophical object, which “withdraws behind all its external effects” (10). We 
cannot touch the harmanian table (for we can never touch any real object) nor even 
know it.
“The real is something that cannot be known, but only loved” (12).
Thus Harman operates a reduction of the world to objects and their qualities which is 
intended to be in the first instance ontological and not epistemological (here Harman 
is mistaken, and the epistemological dimension is omnipresent in his work, but as the 
object of a denegation). This objectal reduction is difficult to argue for, and 
sometimes it is presented as a self-evident truth accessible to every person of good 
will and good sense, and Harman’s philosophy is trumpeted as a return to naiveté and 
concreteness, triumphing over post-structuralist pseudo-sophistication and its 
abstractions. But we shall see that this is not the case.
This reduction of the world to objects and their qualities amounts to a conversion of 
our philosophical vision that is disguised as a return to the real world of concrete 
objects:
“Instead of beginning with radical doubt, we start from naiveté. What philosophy 
shares with the lives of scientists,  bankers, and animals is that all are concerned with 
objects” (THE QUADRUPLE OBJECT, 5).
“Once we begin from naiveté rather than doubt, objects immediately take center 
stage” (idem, 7)
This “self-evidence” of the point of view of naïveté is in fact meticulously 
constructed and highly philosophically motivated. We must recall that Harman’s 
“objects” are not at all the objects of common sense (we cannot know them nor touch 
them). So the “naiveté” that Harman invokes here is not some primitive openness to 
the world (that would only be a variant of the “bucket theory of mind” and of 
knowledge, denounced by Karl Popper). This “naiveté” is a determinate point of 
view, a very particular perspective (the “naive point of view”, as the French 
translation so aptly calls it). Under cover of this word “naiveté”, Harman talks to us 
of a “naïf”  point of view, that is nevertheless an “objectal” point of view., that is to 
say not naïf at all but partisan. Harman deploys all his rhetorical resources to provoke 
in the reader the adoption of the objectal point of view as if it were self-evident. This 
“objectal conversion” is necessary, according to him, to at last get out of the tyranny 
of epistemology and the linguistic turn, and edify a new ontology, new foundation for 
a metaphysics capable of speaking of all objects. We have seen that this “self-
evident” beginning implies both a conversion and a reduction.
We see the parallels and differences of object-oriented ontology in relation to 
Althusserianism. Both relegate the familiar object and the perceptual object to the 
status of social constructions. OOO goes even further and assigns the scientific object 
to the same status of simulacrum (“utter sham”): only philosophy can tell us the truth 
about objects. Both propose a meta-language, but OOO’s meta-language is so de-
qualified that it is susceptible of different instanciations, and in fact no two members 
of the movement have the same concrete ontology. Finally, OOO spreads in making 
abundant, liberal (and here the word has all its import) use of the means that the 
internet makes available: blogs, discussion groups, facebook exchanges, twitter, 
podcasts, streaming.
I have spoken here principally of Graham Harman’s OOO because I do not believe 
that OOO exists in general and I also think that its apparent unity is a deceitful 
façade. There is no substance to the movement, it is rather a matter of agreement on a 
shared meta-language, ie on a certain terminology and set of themes, under the aegis 
of which many different positions can find shelter. I have spoken here almost 
exclusively of THE THIRD TABLE because Harman’s formulations change from 
book to book, and I find that in this little brochure Harman offers us his meta-
language in a pure state. In his other books Harman, without noticing, slides 
constantly between a meta-ontological sense of object and a sense which corresponds 
to one possible instanciation of this meta-language, thus producing much conceptual 
confusion.
My major objection to Harman’s OOO is that it is a school philosophy dealing in 
generalities and abstractions far from the concrete joys and struggles of real human 
beings (“The world is filled primarily not with electrons or human praxis, but with 
ghostly objects withdrawing from all human and inhuman access”, THE THIRD 
TABLE, 12). Despite its promises,  Harman’s OOO does not bring us closer to the 
richness and complexity of the real world but in fact replaces the multiplicitous and 
variegated world with a set of bloodless and lifeless abstractions – his unknowable 
and untouchable, “ghostly”, objects. Not only are objects unknowable, but even 
whether something is a real object or not is unknowable: “we can never know for sure 
what is a real object and what isn’t”.
Yet Harman has legislated that his object is the only real object (cf. THE THIRD 
TABLE, where Harman calls his table, as compared to the table of everyday life and 
the scientist’s table, “the only real one”, 10, and “the only real table”, 11. As for the 
everyday table and the scientific table: “both are equally unreal“, both are “utter 
shams”, 6.  “Whatever we capture, whatever we sit at or destroy is not the real table”, 
12. And he accuses others of “reductionism”!). To say that the real object is 
unknowable (“the real is something that cannot be known”, p12) is an 
epistemological thesis. As is the claim that the object we know, the everyday or the 
scientific object, is unreal.
How can this help us in our lives? It is a doctrine of resignation and passivity: we 
cannot know the real object, the object we know is unreal, an “utter sham”, we cannot 
know what is or isn’t a real object. Harman’s objects do not withdraw, they transcend. 
They transcend our perception and our knowledge, they transcend all relations and 
interactions. As Harman reiterates, objects are deep (“objects are deeper than their 
appearance to the human mind but also deeper than their relations to one another”, 4, 
“the real table is a genuine reality deeper than any theoretical or practical encounter 
with it…deeper than any relations in which it might become involved”, 9-10). This 
“depth” is a key part of Harman’s ontology, which is not flat at all and is the negation 
of immanence. Rather, it is centered on this vertical dimension of depth and 
transcendence.
Harman practices a form of ontological critique which contains both relativist 
elements and dogmatic elements. At the level of explicit content Harman is freer , 
less dogmatic than Althusser, as he does not make science the queen of knowledge. 
Harman situates himself insistantly “after” the linguistic turn, after the so-called 
“epistemologies of access”, after deconstruction and post-structuralism. He considers 
that the time for construction has come, that we must construct a new philosophy by 
means of a return to the things themselves of the world – objects. But is this the case?
D. Feyerabend and the harmfulness of the Ontological Turn
Feyerabend stands in opposition to this demand for a new construction, and 
wholeheartedly espouses the continued necessity of deconstruction. He rejects the 
idea that we need a new system or theoretical framework, arguing that in many cases 
a unified theoretical framework is just not necessary or even useful:
“a theoretical framework may not be needed (do I need a theoretical framework to get 
along with my neighbor?). Even a domain that uses theories may not need a 
theoretical framework (in periods of revolution theories are not used as frameworks 
but are broken into pieces which are then arranged this way and that way until 
something interesting seems to arise)” (Philosophy and Methodology of Military 
Intelligence, 13).
Further, not only is a unified framework often unnecessary, it can be a hindrance to 
our research and to the conduct of our lives: “frameworks always put undue 
constraints on any interesting activity” (ibid, 13). He emphasises that our ideas must 
be sufficiently complex to fit in and to cope with the complexity of our practices (11). 
More important than a new theoretical construction which only serves “to confuse 
people instead of helping them” we need ideas that have the complexity and the 
fluidity that come from close connection with concrete practice and with its “fruitful 
imprecision” (11). Lacking this connection, we get only school philosophies that 
“deceive people but do not help them”. They deceive people by replacing the 
concrete world with their own abstract construction “that gives some general and 
very mislead (sic!) outlines but never descends to details”. The result is a simplistic 
set of slogans and stereotypes that “is taken seriously only by people who have no 
original ideas and think that [such a school philosophy] might help them getting 
ideas”.
Applied to the the ontological turn, this means that an ontological system is useless, a 
hindrance to thought and action, whereas an ontology which is not crystallised into a 
system and principles, but which limits itself to an open set of rules of thumb and of 
free study of concrete cases is both acceptable and desirable. The detour through 
ontology is useless, because according to Feyerabend a more open and less technical 
approach is possible. In effect, Feyerabend indicates what Eddington could have 
replied to Harman: just like Althusserianism OOO must be considered a premature 
and harmful failure because it specifies in an apriori and dogmatic fashion what the 
elements of the world are. This failure is intrinsic to its transcendental approach: it is 
premature because it prejudges the paths and results of empirical research, it is 
harmful because it tends to exclude possible avenues of research and to close people’s 
minds, making them stupid.
Eddington’s position is in fact very complex. He gives a dramatised description of 
what amounts to the incommensurability of the world of physics and the familiar 
world of experience. This is implicit in the whole theme of the necessary “aloofness” 
(xv) that scientific conceptions must maintain with respect to familiar conceptions. 
He then goes on to pose the question of the relation, or “linkage”, between the two. 
Sometimes he seems to give primacy to the familiar world eg: “the whole scientific 
inquiry starts from the familiar world and in the end it must return to the familiar 
world” (xiii), and “Science aims at constructing a world which shall be symbolic of 
the world of commonplace experience” (xiii). Sometimes he gives primacy to the 
world of physics, and seems to declare that the familiar world is illusory, eg: “In 
removing our illusions we have removed the substance, for indeed we have seen that 
substance is one of the greatest of our illusions” (xvi), though he does attenuate this 
by adding: “Later perhaps we may inquire whether in our zeal to cut out all that is 
unreal we may not have used the knife too ruthlessly”. On the question of the relation 
between physics and philosophy he is no mere scientistic chauvinist. Indeed, he gives 
a certain primacy to the philosopher: “the scientist … has good and sufficient reasons 
for pursuing his investigations in the world of shadows and is content to leave to the 
philosopher the determination of its exact status in regard to reality” (xiv). But he 
considers that neither common sense nor philosophy must interfere with physical 
science’s ” freedom for autonomous development” (xv). His conclusion is that 
reflection on modern physics leads to ” a feeling of open-mindedness towards a wider 
significance transcending scientific measurement” (xvi) and warns against a priori 
closure: “After the physicist has quite finished his worldbuilding a linkage or 
identification is allowed; but premature attempts at linkage have been found to be 
entirely mischievous”.
As we can see, Graham Harman ‘s discussion of this text in THE THIRD TABLE 
makes a mess of Eddington’s position, treating him as advocating the scientistic 
primacy of the world of physics. Harman can then propose his own “solution”: the 
objects of both common sense and physics are “utter shams”, the real object is that of 
(Harman’s) philosophy. This is why I think that Harman’s OOO is a contemporary 
example of what Eddington calls “premature attempts at linkage” and that he finds 
“mischievous”, ie both failed and harmful.
My thesis is that much of OOO is a badly flawed epistemology masquerading as an 
ontology. An interesting confirmation of this thesis is the touting of Roy Bhaskar’s A 
REALIST THEORY OF SCIENCE. For those too young to remember: this book 
came out initially in 1975, after the major epistemological works by Popper, Kuhn, 
Lakatos and Feyerabend. It was an ontologising re-appropriation of their 
epistemological discoveries. It was hailed as a great contribution by the Anglophone 
Althusserians (I kid you not!), as it gave substance to their distinction between the 
theoretical object, produced by the theoretical practices of the sciences) and the real 
object. The Althusserians used Bhaskar to legitimate their posing of Althusserian 
Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis as sciences. Their universal critique of any 
philosophical view that did not square with theirs was to disqualify it as demonstrably 
belonging, sometimes in very roundabout and tortuous ways to the “problematic of 
the subject”. Does this begin to sound familiar? real object vs theoretical object, 
problematic of the subject = correlationism. These themes are not new, but go back to 
the dogmatic reaction of the 70s!). It is amusing to see that Bhaskar, who is a prime 
example of someone who invented an ontological correlate to epistemological 
insights, is now being used as the proponent of a non-correlationist “realist” position, 
to condemn those who supposedly give primacy to epistemology over ontology. The 
whole procedure is circular. That is to say, far from really asking the transcendental 
question of what must the world be like for science to be possible? (this is an 
ideological cover-up for the real historical stakes of Bhaskar’s intervention) Bhaskar 
proceeds to an ontologisation of insights and advances in epistemology, and so 
constrains future research with an a posteriori ontology projected backwards as if it 
were an a priori “neutral” precondition of science. So Harman’s supposed primacy of 
ontology is in fact based on his continual denegation of his de facto dependence on 
results imported from epistemology and on the dogmatic freezing and imposition of 
what is at best only a particular historical stage of scientific research and of 
epistemological reflection.
One of my biggest objections to OOO concerns the question of primacy, which 
remains moot in contemporary philosophy. As we have seen, Harman’s ontological 
turn gives primacy to (transcendental, meta-level) philosophy. Feyerabend articulates 
an Eddingtonian position, one that gives primacy neither to philosophy nor to 
physics, but defends the open-mindedness of empirical (though not necessarily 
scientific) research. I think this can be clarified by examining Feyerabend’s defense 
of the “way of the scientist” as against the “way of the philosopher”. Feyerabend’s 
references to Mach (and to Pauli) show that this “way of the scientist” is transversal, 
not respecting the boundaries between scientific disciplines nor those between the 
sciences and the humanities and the arts. So it is more properly called the “way of 
research”. Eddington too seems to espouse this Machian way out of the pitfalls of 
primacy.
Ernst Mach is often seen as a precursor of the logical positivists, an exponent of the 
idea that “things” are logical constructions built up out of the sensory qualities that 
compose the world, mere bundles of sensations. He would thus be a key example of 
what Graham Harman in THE QUADRUPLE OBJECT calls “overmining”. 
Feyerabend has shown in a number of essays that this vision of Mach’s “philosophy” 
(the quotation marks are necessary, according to Feyerabend “because Mach refused 
to be regarded as the proponent of a new “philosophy””, SCIENCE IN A FREE 
SOCIETY, p192)  is erroneous, based on a misreading by the logical positivists that 
confounds his general ontology with one specific ontological hypothesis that Mach 
was at pains to describe as a provisional and research-relative specification of his 
more general proposal.
Following Ernst Mach, Feyerabend expounds the rudiments of what he calls a general 
methodology or a general cosmology (this ambiguity is important: Feyerabend, on 
general grounds but also after a close scrutiny of several important episodes in the 
history of physics, is proceeds as if there is no clear and sharp demarcation between 
ontology and epistemology, whereas Harman, without the slightest case study, is 
convinced of the existence of such a dichotomy). Feyerabend’s discussion of Mach’s 
ontology can be found in SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY (NLB, 1978, p196-203) 
and in many other places, making it clear that it is one of the enduring inspirations of 
his work. Mach’s ontology can be summarised, according to Feyerabend, in two 
points:
1) the world is composed of elements an their relations
2) the nature of these elements and their relations is to be specified by empirical 
research
One may note a resemblance with Graham Harman’s ontology, summarised in his 
“brief SR/OOO tutorial“:
1. Individual entities of various different scales (not just tiny quarks and electrons) 
are the ultimate stuff of the cosmos.
2. These entities are never exhausted by their relations. Objects withdraw from 
relation.
The difference is illuminating. Whereas Mach leaves the nature of these elements 
open, allowing for the exploration of several hypotheses, Harman transcendentally 
reduces these possibilities to one: elements are objects (NB: this reduction of the 
possibilities to one, enshrined in a transcendental principle, is one of the reasons for 
calling Harman’s OOO an objectal reduction). Further, by allowing empirical 
research to specify the relations, Mach does not give himself an a priori principle of 
withdrawal: here again “withdrawal” is just one possibility among many. Another 
advantage of this ontology of unspecified elements is that it allows us to do research 
across disciplinary boundaries, including that between science and philosophy. 
Feyerabend talks of Mach’s ontology’s “disregard for distinctions between areas of 
research. Any method, any type of knowledge could enter the discussion of a 
particular problem” (p197). in my terminology Mach’s ontology is diachronic, 
evolving with and as part of empirical research. Harman’s ontology is synchronic, 
dictating and fixing transcendentally the elements of the world.
Feyerabend uses most often a dialogical method, although he was led to complain 
that this was often a one-sided dialogue. This was because many of the his 
philosophical reviewers were what he called “illiterate”, what I am in this talk calling 
“stupid”, that is to say instances of a dogmatic and decontextualised image of thought 
conjugated with a disindividuated academic professionalism. Of these failed 
dialogues Feyerabend writes (in SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY, 10):
I publish them…because even a one-sided debate is more instructive than 
an essay and because I want to inform the wider public of the astounding 
illiteracy of some “professionals”
Fortunately, not all his dialogues were so one-sided. In his encounters with 
interlocutors Feyerabend tends to function like a zen master, trying to get people to 
change their attitude, to get them to “sense chaos” where they perceive “an orderly 
arrangement of well behaved things and processes” (cf. his LAST LETTER). A very 
instructive example of this can be seen in his correspondence on military intelligence 
networks with Isaac Ben-Israel, over a 2 year period stretching from September 1988 
to October 1990.
Though Feyerabend mainly refers to the philosophy of science, after all it was his 
domain of specialisation for many long years, he gives sporadic indications that his 
remarks apply to all philosophy, to all “school philosophies”, and not just to 
epistemology and the philosophy of sciences. So it is possible to see in a very general 
way what Feyerabend’s ideas on ontology are in this epistolary dialogue which 
begins with considerations of school philosophy as a useless detour, comparing it 
unfavourably to a more “naive” unacademic critical approach (Feyerabend’s first 
letter, L1: p5-6), goes on to consider in a little more detail what an unacademic 
critical philosophy would look like (L2: p11-14)  proceeds to plead for the “non-
demarcation” of the sciences and the arts-humanities” and for the need to see 
epistemology and ontology as parts of politics (L3: p21-23),, and culminates in L4-5 
(p31-33) with a sketch of Feyerabend’s own views on ontology. This is an amazing 
document, as the dialogue form takes Feyerabend into a domain that he has not 
discussed before (intelligence networks) and permits a concise yet progressive 
exposition of his later ideas and of their “fruitful imprecision”.
Feyerabend tells us that ontological critique, or the detour through ontology, is 
unnecessary, because a more open and less technical approach is possible. He gives 
various figurations of that unacademic approach: the educated layman, discoverers 
and generals, certain Kenyan tribes, a lawyer interrogating experts, the Homeric 
Greek worldview, his own minimalist ontology. The advantages he cites of such an 
unacademic approach are:
1) ability to “work in partly closed surroundings” where there is a “flow of 
information in some direction, not in others” (p5)
2) action that is sufficiently complex to “fit in” to the complexity of our practices 
(p11) and of the real world (p12)
3) ability to work without a fixed “theoretical framework”,  to “work outside well-
defined frames” (p22), to break up frameworks and to rearrange the pieces as the 
circumstances demand, to not be limited by the “undue constraints” inherent to any 
particular framework (p13)
4) ability to work not just outside the traditional prejudices of a particular domain 
(p5) but outside the boundaries between domains, such as the putative boundary 
between the arts and the sciences (p21)
5) an awareness of the political origins and consequences of seemingly apolitical 
academic subjects: ontology “without politics is incomplete and arbitrary” (p22).
But one could object that Feyerabend is a relativist and so that “empirical research” 
for him could give whatever result we want, because in his system anything goes. In 
fact the best gloss of this polemical slogan is “anything could work (but mostly 
doesn’t)”. Feyerabend’s epistemological realism is supported by an ontological 
realism: “reality (or Being) has no well-defined structure but reacts in different ways 
to different approaches”. This is one reason why he sometimes refuses the label of 
“relativist”, because according to him “Relativism presupposes a fixed framework”. 
For Feyerabend, the transversality of communication between people belonging to 
apparently incommensurable structures shows that the notion of a frame of reference 
that is fixed and impermeable has only a limited applicability:
“people with different ways of life and different conceptions of reality can learn to 
communicate with each other, often even without a gestalt-switch, which means, as 
far as I am concerned, that the concepts they use and the perceptions they have are 
not nailed down but are ambiguous”.
Nevertheless, he distinguishes between Being, as ultimate reality, which is 
unknowable, and the multiple manifest realities which are produced by our 
interaction with it, and which are themselves knowable. Approach Being in one way, 
across decades of scientific experiment, and it produces elementary particles, 
approach it in another way and it produces the Homeric gods:
“I now distinguish between an ultimate reality, or Being. Being cannot be known, 
ever (I have arguments for that). What we do know are the various manifest realities, 
like the world of the Greek gods, modern cosmology etc. These are the results of an 
interaction between Being and one of its relatively independent parts” (32).
The difference with relativism is that there is no guarantee that the approach will 
work, Being is independent of us and must respond positively, which is often not the 
case.
Feyerabend draws the conclusion that the determination of what is real and what is a 
simulacrum cannot be the prerogative of an abstract ontology, and thus of the 
intellectuals who promulgate it. There is no fixed framework, the manifest realities 
are multiple, and Being is unknowable. Thus the determination of what is real 
depends on our choice in favour of one form of life or another, ie on a political 
decision. This leads to Feyerabend’s conclusion: ontology “without politics is 
incomplete and arbitrary”.
Inversely, Harman has repeated many times that ontology has nothing to do with 
politics. Seen through Feyerabend’s eyes Harman’s OOO is thus both incomplete, 
because it is apolitical, and arbitrary, because it is a priori and monist, we have 
already said that, but also because it attributes to a little tribe of intellectuals the right 
to tell us what is real (Harman’s “ghostly objects withdrawing from all human and 
inhuman access”, THE THIRD TABLE, 12) and what is unreal (the simulacra of 
common sense, of the humanities, and of the sciences). It is also harmful because it is 
based on ghostly bloodless merely intelligible real objects that transcend any of the 
régimes and practices that give us qualitatively differentiated objects in any 
recognisable sense. Objects withdraw from the diverse truth-régimes (the sciences, 
the humanities, common sense, but also from religion and politics), i.e. 
etymologically they abstract themselves: real objects are abstractions, indeed they are 
abstraction itself. This is not a revolutionary new “weird” realism, this is regressive 
transcendent realism, cynically packaged as its opposite. I consider Harman’s OOO 
as a purified and consensualised (i.e. demarxised depoliticised descientised) version 
of Althusser’s ontology of the real object and of his anti-humanism, and as exhibiting 
the same defects as any other synchronic ontology.
E. CONCLUSION
The structure of my argument is very classical, and very abstract, as it remains 
wholly in the domain of philosophy, and even worse of first philosophy. So to 
conclude I would like to give some indications to show that these questions are, or 
can be, very practical. In his article NEW ONTOLOGIES Andrew Pickering presents 
the two ontologies that I discuss in terms of the contrast between the painters De 
Kooning and Mondrian. Mondrian’s paintings are examples of a synchronic 
approach, where the subect distances itself from the world in order to dominate it, 
according to a transcendent plan which imposes its abstract representations on a 
passive material. The painter foresees and imposes his order on everything, there is 
no room for surprises that emerge during the process of painting. The canvas does 
nothing, it is receptive rather than agentive, there is no exchange between the painter 
and his canvas, no dialogue.
On the other hand, De Kooning’s canvases participate themselves in the elaboration 
of the work. There is a continual back-and-forth between the painter and his canvas, 
“between the perception of emergent effects and the attempt to intensify them”. The 
De Kooningian approach is diachronic, it involves an immanent, concrete, incarnated, 
open process of engagement in the world, whereas the Mondrianesque approach is 
synchronic and implies a transcendent , abstract, disincarnated, closed process of 
distanciation from the world. The Mondrianesque approach corresponds, according to 
Pickering, to Heideggerian “enframing”, while the De Kooningian approach practices 
aletheia, unveiling.
Pickering’s hope is that the diachronic practices which are still marginal in our 
society can come together and overflow or dissolve the dominant synchronic 
enframing. Pickering gives several concrete examples of diachronic practices, not 
only in art (De Kooning) but also in civil engineering (the ecological and adaptative 
management of a river) and also in psychiatry (anti-psychiatric experiments like 
Kingsley Hall, institutional psychotherapy like La Borde, favourising symmetric and 
non-hierarchical relations). He also talks of mathematics, music and architecture, to 
show in each case the concrete effects of both approaches. Thus we should keep in 
mind that even if the discussion in this paper is situated on the conceptual plane, the 
differences and disputes over ontology are inseparable from our concrete daily 
existence.
